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THE COSTS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
HOME SEARCHES AND TAKINGS LAW
Arianna Kennedy Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
A government actor's forcing a private citizen to submit to some phys-
ical occupation of his land is at the heart of a Fifth Amendment taking.' A
home search conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment also fits this
description; it involves the forced submission of the home's residents to the
entrance of government agents for whatever length of time is necessary to
complete the search. While compensation is possible for damage caused to
personal property incident to the search,2 homeowners are not compen-
sated for the government's use of the physical space of the home. The
exclusion of home searches from the realm of takings is unjust. A home is a
home and what constitutes a compensable intrusion into it should not de-
pend on the purpose animating that intrusion. From the point of view of
the homeowner, the cost is borne regardless of the purpose of the
intrusion.
The current interpretation of the Takings Clause provides strong sup-
port for finding home searches to be takings. This essay will explore the
reasons why home searches are not seen as such and possible palliatives to
the harms caused by such searches.' When compared to widely accepted
eminent domain takings - such as an easement across a property to allow
for beach access' or the placement of wires into the walls of a building' -
the criminal search can be a far more jarring experience and greater intru-
sion upon the private space of the home. Searches are typically done with-
out prior notice to the home's inhabitants, and involve a far more cavalier
treatment of their personal property and private possessions. While there
are valid reasons for the often brutal nature of the Fourth Amendment
search (a gentler search with greater respect for privacy would afford a
commensurately greater opportunity to destroy or hide of the evidence that
* Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County, Mass.; Harvard Law School, J.D. 2008; Harvard
College, A.B. 2005. I thank Professors William Stuntz and Carol Steiker for their invaluable advising. I
also thank Alex Potapov, Ellen Weis and Larissa Kelly for their support and encouragement during the
writing of this Piece.
1. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).
2. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1981).
3. I have chosen to look at the home in this Essay for two main reasons. First, it is a frequent
source of litigation in both takings law and criminal cases. Particularly in criminal cases, crucial evi-
dence is frequently in the home because it may be the sole private place a criminal defendant has.
Second, the home is fundamentally connected to notions of privacy and personal space. For two doc-
trines which both give serious attention to the interplay between privacy and property rights, the home
provides a prime example of how these concepts need not (and perhaps cannot) be disentangled.
4. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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was the object of the search), these searches nonetheless impose costs upon
their subjects.
The jurisprudence on takings cases and Fourth Amendment cases cur-
rently find citizens' rights on these subjects officially grounded in different
values. Takings cases are fundamentally based in property rights with com-
pensation afforded on the basis of the harm to property value the owners
have suffered as the result of the government's intrusion. Since Katz v.
United States,6 the rights afforded under the Fourth Amendment are pri-
vacy rights, and have been thought of as attaching to "people, not places."'
The specifics of the physical space in which the search occurs, such as
whether the subject of the search owns the property, are meant to take a
back seat to the looser doctrine of the expectations people attach to their
conduct at any point in time. However, doctrine in this area remains con-
fused as to whether the Fourth Amendment's protections are fundamen-
tally tied to the historical protection of property rights or the more modern
conception of privacy rights.
Though the extent to which courts have even tried to cleave strictly to
privacy rights in Fourth Amendment law is questionable, it would nonethe-
less still be difficult to separate the notion of an individual's legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy from his physical location. No matter how private an
individual seated in an open field may believe his conversation to be, the
courts see no legitimacy in his expectation.' Conversely, there are other
physical spaces, such as the home, where courts believe expectations of pri-
vacy are unassailably legitimate. An individual's expectation of privacy
cannot be fully severed from his physical location and while the assertion
that the Fourth Amendment protects people is true, it protects them only
so long as they remain in particular places. As a result, the right to privacy
in these places and their sacrosanct quality under the law are protected. To
the extent that the Fourth Amendment's protection is dependent on an
individual's physical location, the boundaries of personal space protected
are tied to an individual's property interest in his location.
Particularly in the case of the home, property rights and privacy rights
become deeply intertwined. To a large measure, the value that individuals
derive from their homes is due to the privacy it affords them, and the law
has recognized the value of this privacy in a number of contexts. Homes
are explicitly mentioned as a protected sphere under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and to date, courts have been highly opposed to any sort of unwar-
ranted physical incursion into the home. However, they have been
permissive with the plain sight doctrine, allowing activities such as flyovers
and other methods of gathering information about the private space of the
home so long as the information is gathered from outside the home's physi-
cal boundaries. In contrast, takings law does not have to interest itself in
questions of privacy, as typical takings cases give the property owner the
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Id. at 351.
8. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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opportunity to remove the private nature of the sphere (if not the attach-
ment to the space) prior to any government intrusion. If takings law re-
quires compensation for the intrusion onto property interests alone when
there is no conceivable harm to the privacy interests that adhere to the
property, we should certainly compensate when, although there has been a
lesser violation of the property interest as a whole, there has been much
greater violence to the privacy interests that the property interests protect.9
Criminal suspects bear real costs as a result of home searches, costs of a
kind for which others would demand compensation. Viewing home
searches through the lens of takings law leads to an interesting inconsis-
tency: while the Fourth Amendment turns a blind eye to the costs incurred
by legitimate searches, the care for individuals' property embodied in the
Takings Clause helps to illustrate why this blindness is unjust.
There are arguments against compensation in these cases, unlike in the
typical takings scenario where an individual's property is taken largely as
the result of accident of location, home searches are generally conducted
on criminal suspects. Arguably, individuals whose homes are searched are,
as a class, more likely to have had some role in creating the need for the
home search; the costs they bear could be seen as akin to imposing court
costs on acquitted defendants. This argument treads dangerously close to a
punitive argument against criminal suspects; the subjects of home searches
have not been convicted of any crime, nor, frequently, even formally
charged. Further, court costs are generally waivable for individuals of lim-
ited means, who cannot bear the costs that would otherwise be imposed
upon them. There is no similar system that can compensate individuals for
the psychic injuries of the home invasion.
I do not suggest these should exist as a sort of modified Bivens claim,"o
but instead that homeowners should be compensated regardless of whether
the search was warranted or reasonable. The harm which occurs as a result
of the taking is not dependent on the reasonableness of the search; it is not
the presence or absence of the government's right to search the home
which contributes to the owner's feeling of violation but instead, the intrin-
sic violations of the search itself. I am also not proposing that takings be
used as a way to stop necessary searches, but instead as a means to en-
courage law enforcement officials to reduce the costs they impose in con-
ducting them (as I do not imagine that 'payouts of this kind ever would be
made, this Article is a theoretical exercise rather than a policy suggestion).
The question of whether the government produced sufficient evidence to
9. While payments based purely on the current takings regime of compensation for the value of
the rent of the property over the time of the seizure would be relatively small given the limited duration
and property damage caused. by a home search, an implicit characteristic of the value of property is
found in the private space it affords. The payments granted for loss of exclusive use of property in the
absence of damage to property and payments granted for trespass bespeak a concern in property law
for the privacy property affords. See infra pp. 39-41.
10. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
When a plaintiff seeks relief for a violation of his constitutional rights, it is often referred to as " Bivens
claim."
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obtain a warrant or had exigent circumstances, which would allow the evi-
dence to be presented in a court of law, is quite aside from the considera-
tions at play in this case. From the perspective of the homeowner, the
home search carries with it equal or greater harms to intrusions onto prop-
erty that are clearly compensable.
Part I looks at the boundaries of the home as defined under the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment has long recognized the special sta-
tus of the home in the expectations of citizens, but cases have been far from
consistent in their holdings as to whether this right is one relating to prop-
erty or privacy. By untethering the protections of the Fourth Amendment
from property rights and instead attaching them to privacy rights, the Su-
preme Court has made the injuries suffered less directly and clearly com-
pensable than under my proposal, though the harms suffered are no less
profound. I suggest that Fourth Amendment law tends to protect individu-
als where they have both some form of a property interest" and a privacy
interest in the space searched, and offers no protection where only the pri-
vacy interest has been surrendered in some way. Thus, when a home
search is conducted which implicates the Fourth Amendment - requiring
probable cause and a warrant - it is virtually guaranteed to intrude upon
the subject's most private and intimate property.
Part II explores the significance of the home in theoretical literature
and why it is a space deserving of particular protections, specifically with
regard to the privacy value the home affords. I look to Margaret Jane Ra-
din's personhood theory of property law to analyze how this intrusion into
private space damages the individual. Radin analyzes both Fourth Amend-
ment searches and takings to explore reasons why property, and particu-
larly intimate and private spaces such as the home, has a significant
deserving protection beyond its mere economic value. Her theory de-
scribes how the attachments individuals form to certain types of property
(such as the home) connect to their sense of self, and ascribe a particularly
high status to and need for protection for these types of property. I use this
theory to explain the nature of the loss suffered in a home search.
Part III analyzes current takings law, looking specifically to its treat-
ment of features of home searches which differ from more typical physical
takings. Going through these factors one at a time, it is clear none of them
individually preclude a home search from being considered a taking. I also
look briefly to trespass law to note a system which has already recognized a
harm to the property owner apart from mere intrusion.
Part IV makes the argument for why home searches should be viewed
as takings, and addresses possible reasons why they may not. The main
reasons that home searches are unlikely to be conceived of as takings are
the practical issues which arise in criminal law which do not occur in tak-
ings law; such as the often culpable nature of the claimants, the frequency
of home searches, the ephemeral nature of the harm suffered, the difficulty
11. This is subject to some exceptions. See infra notes 28-30.
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in assessing the monetary value of the harm, and the chilling effect on law
enforcement activities. However, though they may properly describe why
payments do not and will not occur, I argue that these are not bars to view-
ing these sorts of invasions as outside the scope of takings, but administra-
tive challenges only.
II. BOUNDARIES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment's protections help illuminate both the value
and importance of privacy in the home and demonstrate the depth of the
harm wreaked upon the execution of a search warrant, concepts also com-
mon to takings inquiries. By considering these strands, we begin to see
how takings law raises important questions about home searches.
The Fourth Amendment has long recognized the special status of the
home in the expectations of citizens.12 The doctrine against unreasonable
searches and seizures originally derived from the English common law of
trespass, forbidding the state from entering onto a citizen's property merely
because it was a state actor rather than a private one.13 The framers con-
ceived the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure as one fun-
damentally linked to property rights. Over the years, Katz and its
progenyl4 have shifted the grounding of Fourth Amendment protections to
privacy rights, but the importance of property rights in determining
whether individuals have a legitimate, objective right to privacy in a partic-
ular location has not disappeared. Particularly in the wake of Kyllo v.
United States,5 the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable
and unwarranted searches maintain a strong relationship to property rights.
Search and seizure jurisprudence illuminates the complicated interre-
lations between privacy and property rights. The home and the property
rights which attach to it are important and protected because of the private
space they afford. However, the space would not be "private" if the
boundaries of the location were not protected and the right of exclusive use
a strong one. If the owner had to worry that the space might be entered by
others, it would cease to be a truly private area and would not be as valua-
ble. This problem is only exacerbated by the fact that an individual's pri-
vacy expectations are only legitimate under the Fourth Amendment when
an individual is in a place the law considers to be "private." Even if the
individual has a firmly held, subjective conviction that the space is private,
12. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-512, n.4 (1961). ("A man can still control a
small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge
that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-
worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis,
some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which
is a man's castle." United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (Frank, J., dissenting)).
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-28 (1886) (citing Entick v. Carrington and Three
Other King's Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)).
14. Katz, 389 U.S. 347; New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980).
15. 533 U.S. 27, 34-41 (2001).
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his concerns are irrelevant if society does not agree.1 6 In practice, as well,
these two bases do not lead to marked differences in the outcomes they
produce. The major difference of the privacy rather than property ground-
ing is that it affords greater protection for spaces over which the individual
exercises only a temporary or incomplete dominion" and removes protec-
tions from individuals who have allowed others access to or information
about their property."s
In this way, Katz has created a regime wherein an individual's pro-
tected spaces under the Fourth Amendment are primarily a subset of the
spaces to which he has some property claim. Specifically, they are the
spaces where an individual has not only a property claim, but where he has
also taken steps the greater society considers reasonable and necessary to
ensure his privacy in the space. Where he has not taken these steps, the
Fourth Amendment offers no protection, despite his property interest.
When police action becomes an event under the Fourth Amendment, it is
likely to infringe upon the property rights the individual has protected for
his most intimate and private conduct. When a home search occurs, violat-
ing that space, it is almost guaranteed to take a psychic toll upon the
resident.
A. Progression of the Fourth Amendmentl9
The history of the Fourth Amendment is the story of two evolving and
competing bases for its existence: protection for the home and property
rights and an individual's innate right to have his privacy respected (limited
by society's recognition of the legitimacy of this expectation). Grounded in
the common law of trespass,20 the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures was originally understood as a right grounded in the right to
own property; just as private individuals had no right to intrude on one's
home and papers, neither did the government except in those cases where
the government had gained approval from a magistrate.2 1 Over time
though, the courts applied the protections of the Fourth Amendment to
individuals who had no property rights to the locations they were in at the
time of the search. The most famous example is Katz, which reassigned the
basis of the Fourth Amendment from property law to an individual's right
to privacy from government intrusion in its often-quoted statement that the
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); but see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (ex-
pressly stating that individuals legally in a private space do not automatically have standing to raise a
Fourth Amendment challenge).
18. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-328 (1987).
19. This discussion is by no means a comprehensive survey of the bases of the Fourth Amend-
ment; I explore this theme only to the extent necessary to assess the current state of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. See Thomas K. Clancy, "What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?," 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307 (1998) for a comprehensive survey of this topic.
20. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.
21. For an extended discussion, see Justice Scalia's dissent in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,
143 (2006). He discusses which individuals were and were not capable of consenting to a home search
over time, which was grounded in the principles of property law.
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Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places." 2 2 This has expanded
Fourth Amendment privacy rights to grant standing to overnight visitors in
the homes of others to challenge the legality of searches. 23 The Court has
not, however, expanded its protections to guests who are present in an-
other's home for only a short period of time.24
Post-Katz, the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are
vague at best. While Katz promises to protect individuals' expectations of
privacy, determining precisely when individuals are rightfully exercising
these expectations can be a daunting task. People inside their bedrooms
have clearly recognized expectations of privacy;25 those standing in the
middle of a field clearly have none.2 6 What are the crucial factors that
make one's actions more akin to the first group than the second?
Throughout the progression of cases on this issue, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment have been limited to serve the needs of law en-
forcement and have not been quick to embrace expansions to existing con-
ceptions of privacy.27 In case after case, the Supreme Court has gone to
great lengths to permit any sort of information which might have been
(even if it was not, in fact) gathered visually to be unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment. Plain sight permissions are sometimes carried to ex-
tremes, with the Court concluding that inspection of garbage left on the
street, 28 taking photographs of backyards from overhead aircraft, 29 and ob-
servations of the inside of a home made through open drapes,3 0 are non-
events under the Fourth Amendment despite individuals' subjective - and
many would argue, objectively reasonable - beliefs that an ordinary person
would believe themselves and their possessions private in these locations.
The inquiry simply ends at the non-trespassory nature of the search, rather
than examining what subjective and objectively reasonable expectations of
privacy an individual might have had."1 It is enough that the individual did
not have or had given up the right of exclusion in some way.
Despite these incursions, the Fourth Amendment has always been so-
licitous in its protections of physical incursions into the home's privacy.
Deriving its protections from the phrase "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects," 3 2 the home seems to have long served as a gold standard in criminal
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
23. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99.
24. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Hester, 265 U.S. at 57.
27. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Hicks,
480 U.S. at 326-28.
28. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1985).
29. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-52.
30. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-468 (1971). Though sight alone cannot justify
a warrantless seizure, the mere sight of an item in a window is itself a non-event.
31. See supra notes 28-30.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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law for spaces that must be protected." Kyllo reasserted the protected na-
ture of the home over Katz's ambiguity as to the relevance of physical
boundaries in determining Fourth Amendment protections.34 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion drew on the historical protections of the home to
set forth the proposition that all people have some minimal expectation of
privacy within the home. He draws on the view from Silverman and its
progeny, that the home is a "constitutionally protected area,"3 to support
the proposition that "[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details."36
Instead of parsing through what might have been observed from outside
the home" and concluding that the homeowners have no privacy right over
disclosure of these facts, Kyllo affirms a line of cases painting a bright line
around the entrance of the home.38 Although Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion criticized the majority for the lengths it stretched in finding "inti-
mate details" delivered by use of the thermal imaging system,3 9 Kyllo's re-
fusal to permit any warrantless uses of technology, which had only a tiny
possibility of capturing intimate details of the home, has not been upset in
any meaningful way in the eight years since the decision.4 0
Kyllo makes more sense when looked at from a takings-like perspec-
tive. The unauthorized "use" of the home seems to be the determinative
factor in finding that the infrared surveillance constituted a "search." The
house itself could be seen as giving information: the outer surface of the
house could be read and processed to learn about the relative temperatures
inside. In this way, the house's exterior is "used," despite the near-total
lack of any private information being revealed.
B. What is Really Protected After Katz?
Why does the plain view doctrine or other non-physical surveillance
into the home have such an easy time passing constitutional muster? While
there are somewhat reasonable hooks to explain why an individual has sac-
rificed some measure of his privacy when he allows others to see into his
home, it is far more difficult to claim that an individual has invited the
world to violate his privacy if his drapes are cracked or if a plane could fly
over his backyard. It is also difficult to reconcile how the individual with
the cracked drapes has a less reasonable expectation of privacy than Katz
had in the public phone booth or the overnight visitor had in his friend's
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Justice Scalia notes the "firm line" that has been drawn around the entrance of the home.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).
35. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
36. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
37. For example, what a mailman might see putting mail through a slot, or what a utility repre-
sentative might notice while checking a meter.
38. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
39. Id. at 48-50.
40. The only decision which comes close is Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). However,
the Court clearly differentiates the holding on the grounds that the dogs only alert for contraband,
rather than reveal any protected, intimate details. Further, the search was of a car rather than a home;
cars have long been regarded as having less intrinsic privacy than homes.
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home. The latter two must be aware that others could walk past them at
any time, possibly hear their conversations, or see what they are doing. I
posit that the answer to these seeming contradictions is that the Fourth
Amendment continues to primarily protect property rights rather than pri-
vacy rights. The wide allowances of the plain sight doctrine seem to owe
more to Boyd than Katz, the former case maintaining that "the eye cannot
by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass."4 1 The plain sight doctrine
does not entail a physical incursion, it must be accomplished before a prop-
erty right has been upset.
Payton v. New York continues to complicate the claim that the Fourth
Amendment is not grounded in property rights by holding that police of-
ficers have much greater freedoms to arrest individuals outside of their
homes than inside of them.42 This seemingly magical quality of a home to
confer immunity from warrantless arrest to a person as soon as he is inside
does not seem to accord with Katz's claim that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment are for people rather than places. The same individual
who gave the police the same probable cause for arrest at a nearly identical
point in time, already sacrificed his right to privacy by being in public and
taking whatever action caused the basis for the arrest. The privacy of the
individual, at least over such brief periods of time as are contemplated in
Payton, is not something that can be regained once surrendered. The pri-
vacy Payton seeks to protect is that of the home, even when the need for
the arrest of the individual is pressing upon the police officers. Here, the
right clearly attaches to the property rather than the individual.
The decisions relating to the application of the Fourth Amendment to
encounters in and around the home, which have followed Katz, make more
sense if Katz's claim to protect "people, not places" is ignored, or at least
not taken at face value.4 3 The best explanation for the spheres of privacy
protected under the Fourth Amendment appears to be grounded in prop-
erty law rather than in individuals' expectations of privacy.44 An individual
is generally seen as having a legitimate privacy interest when he is in a
place over which he exercises some sort of dominion. This need not be a
permanent or perfect property interest in the place, but he must have been
given some sort of license to be in the place for a substantial period of time.
The phone booth in Katz belongs to the phone company but the company
grants an implied license to members of the public to use it; Katz could not
have been thrown out of the phone booth by any member of the public so
long as he was in the booth. At the time he was in the booth, his claim to it
41. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 628.
42. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-87. See also New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990) (specifying
that the protections against in-house arrest are meant to protect the home rather than the individual).
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
44. Indeed, even looking within Katz itself, the Court must resort to the language of property to
describe what it means when it says the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places. In the
next paragraph after that claim, the Court attempts to illustrate when an individual has a legitimate
right of privacy by offering various locations where an individual might rightfully believe he would not
be heard by the government, such as an office, taxicab or friend's apartment. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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was superior to all members of the public. However, a temporary guest in
a home who may be dismissed at the owner's will has no such protections;
his stay on the premises is at all times controlled by his host. He never
develops any claim of right to the space he inhabits and accordingly gains
no Fourth Amendment protections. 4 5 Simply put, post-Katz cases have
not, in practice, created a sphere of privacy that travels with the individual
claiming protection, but they have only slightly broadened the areas pro-
tected against government trespass.
However, this protection does not extend to all of an individual's
property rights; he must also not have surrendered any of the privacy inter-
ests afforded by his dominion over the space. Individuals who have full
and complete property interests in their spaces are seen as surrendering
their right to privacy if they allow the area to be seen or perceived by the
outside world in some fashion. 46 Having some sort of property claim is not
sufficient to merit protection without also safeguarding the area. The con-
tours of the doctrine are such that protected areas are essentially a subset
of an individual's property interests, specifically those the individual has
kept the most private.
The purpose of the home search is to discover what is contained within
the home; we only reach the home search in cases where law enforcement
could not obtain the necessary information either through sensory technol-
ogy or the resident's exposing the interior of the home in some way.47 It is
important to note that in the case of this physical entrance, the individual
has a full property interest in the area being searched, as well as legitimate
privacy interests as recognized by the state. The home search not only
tramples upon property rights, in direct opposition to the purpose of the
Takings Clause, but it is almost assuredly trampling on a property right that
protects an individual's intimate associations and privacy. The damage
caused by such an invasion is as severe as a trespass can be.
My argument is strengthened by New York v. Burger.48 Burger held
that searches of commercial properties, particularly those in highly regu-
lated industries, have a lower threshold of reasonableness because owners
45. But see Olson, 495 U.S. at 91. An overnight visitor has been granted some limited license to
the premises where he is staying; he is given some space of his own and it would at least be inappropri-
ate for a guest granted permission to stay in a home to be kicked out in the middle of the night.
However, this is a case where the Fourth Amendment's protections actually do seem to be grounded
more in privacy than property; the guest's property claim is far from perfected, and remains no more
than an expectation that he will be allowed to use the space without interference for the night. It is
interesting that the protections for individuals who do not have a valid property claim seem to be
mostly directed at homes; one cannot help but wonder if the law's strong protection of the boundaries
of the home has expanded to protect the hosts of guests who are searched from unreasonable
intrusions.
46. See supra notes 28-30.
47. The standard is necessarily a fact-based one, but the law enforcement officers must show
probable cause to be granted the warrant, meaning "there is a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). This
inquiry must be secondary to other forms of evidence-gathering, as the warrant will only be granted
upon a showing of other evidence to a magistrate supporting the conclusion contraband will be found.
48. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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have less of a legitimate right to privacy within them.4 9 This was found to
hold true even for warrantless searches by administrative agencies or police
officers charged with enforcing the regulatory regimes under which the
companies worked."o Essentially, if owners are accustomed to inspectors
regularly coming onto their property, the owners cannot expect that those
inspectors will not avail themselves of their full investigative powers and
search other areas they find to be suspicious. For individuals in highly reg-
ulated industries, the entrances onto their property are more properly akin
to being seen as licenses for operation or other fees than as close analogs of
home searches.
Workplaces are fundamentally different from homes in that they are
not places of intimate association, but a combination of public and private
space. Individuals simply do not have the freedoms at work that they pos-
sess at home in that they may not exercise total rights of exclusion. They
may not engage in discriminatory hiring practices, create a hostile work
environment, or engage in many other practices an individual in a home
would be free to pursue. Because of this known quality of a workplace,
those who enter it are already on notice that the space is not one of com-
plete privacy, but part of the public sphere. In heavily regulated industries,
attachment to the particularities of the place and loss felt at the opening of
the space are simply not present because people do not allow these sorts of
attachments to form. Highly regulated industries usually are such because
they pose some general threat to the public if unregulated; thus, individuals
are not allowed to engage in these sorts of professions unless they can offer
some assurance that they will not create the harm anticipated. They are
frequently required to obtain licenses or pay fees to offset the possible
damage they might cause and the cost of maintaining public safety. This is
not generally seen as a taking because there is fundamentally some consen-
sual exchange occurring between the government and the regulated entity.
The government confers some special power to engage in a dangerous busi-
ness and the individual gives up some form of property right, usually a
monetary amount, but it could also surrender the right to exclusive use of
the regulated property. The individual need not enter this bargain and
thus, need never surrender the right of exclusive use; the individual may
also exit the highly regulated industry and reclaim the totally exclusive use
of his property at any time. While one could claim the criminal defendant
could also simply allow government agents in, and thereby eliminate forced
entry at the point of a warranted search, the individual has no actual choice
in the matter of whether the government agents will be entering.
While criminal defendants also impose costs on society, the Court
finds ample differences between the case of the home search and the search
of commercial property in Burger, and for good cause. Perhaps in a hypo-
thetical world in which entrances into the home were commonplace, where
49. Id. at 702.
50. Id. at 702-06.
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everyone's home was a heavily regulated location subject to routine inspec-
tion by government agents, there would be less of a case for home searches
being takings. However, privacy and property rights can often have a kind
of circular quality to them in that if a place is expected to be protected,
people vest their privacy rights there and it takes on greater value to them.
Homes are not subject to routine intrusions, the public does not want them
to be and neither does the Court; because we do not expect intrusions, we
allow ourselves to use the home as a private space. The public may want
certain industries regulated because of their possibly deleterious effects on
the public welfare, but it does not want that sort of intrusion into their
private lives or those of their neighbors and the Court has never attempted
to open the home in this fashion.
The effect of Katz on searches into private areas has not been to di-
vorce the protections of the Fourth Amendment from property rights, but
instead to limit the protections to only those spaces where the owner has
manifested an interest in privacy. The Court recognizes the special position
of the home to an individual in its strong protections of the rights to privacy
and exclusive use. By painting such a "firm line"" around the home, the
Court allows individuals to feel secure in their privacy, and thus strength-
ens the connection between property and privacy in the domestic sphere.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HOME: A THEORETICAL BASIS
The reader might reasonably ask why physical entrances into the home
for such a limited time and scope matter, and even if they do matter, why
are they worth the effort and judicial resources necessary to compensate
for them? Physical encroachments onto private property occur daily in
many different forms from private citizens or government officials acciden-
tally or intentionally walking over lawns, making visits, etc. Trespasses are
extremely common and generally easily brooked, and while home searches
are a more traumatic form of trespass than most, they are fundamentally
fleeting events. The rapid nature and limited scope of the search would
also translate into a fairly limited economic compensation; as translated
into a "rent" for a property during the hours needed to conduct the search,
payments would be unlikely to break two digits. Given the limited nature
of both the intrusion and compensation, an argument could be made that
compensation would have purely symbolic significance.
Though the cash value may not be large, I would argue that the value
of seizing the property, even for a short time, stands in for the value of the
privacy pierced by the search. Intuitively, it seems clear that an individual
would likely have to be paid a fairly significant amount of money to allow
government officials to conduct a home search, likely far more than he
would have to be paid to merely leave his home and have no use of it for
the same period of time so the government could conduct sound testing
which made the home unlivable. The time of the seizure, denying the
51. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
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homeowner use of the property, is identical; but the former scenario in-
volves a denial of exclusive use by intruding into the intimate space of the
home, whereas the latter is a complete taking during the same time and
would likely merit greater payment.
This loss of exclusive use in private spaces is extremely damaging and
thus, worthy of more significant compensation.5 2 Though takings law
rarely contemplates incomplete seizures or takings of still-intimate
spaces,5 3 it recognizes the loss of exclusive use of a property as a taking and
the legal framework is in place to consider the damages actually stemming
from the taking of that right.54 The intuition that the search mentioned
above would be far more offensive than the temporary and planned evacu-
ation is due to the home not being a purely fungible asset, but instead a
place fraught with personal significance to the owner. In many areas of the
law, it has been designated as a special place," being the site of most of the
owner's intimate associations and a physical manifestation of himself in
many ways. This is recognized at law in the payments over market that are
typically given in takings cases. 56 People are simply not indifferent be-
tween their home and a dwelling of equal market value; there is some other
characteristic that is unique to the particular property.
A. The Personhood Theory of Property
To explore this special quality of the home, I look to Margaret Radin's
"personhood" theory of property which holds that property's value is not
completely based upon its physical characteristics.57  Radin argues that
property deserves protections because of the values and expectations with
which owners imbue it, such that certain types of property may be right-
fully seen as extensions of its owner." Objects and assets also have value
in what they allow a person to do, either for their value in trade or more
specific permissions they afford a person (such as a home's giving a person
52. While modern takings are often justified on grounds of forcing government efficiency, which
has become foundational, takings nonetheless have an extremely long tradition in American law dating
to the Fifth Amendment's ratification in 1791. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967); Darryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitu-
tional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 349 (2000). As such, compensating for home searches may help to
better balance the government's interests in protecting private property and public safety.
53. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-38 (decided in 1982 as a matter of first impression).
54. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
55. This special position for the home has been long recognized in the law. The castle doctrine in
criminal law allows individuals to take lethal action against trespasses into their home and essentially
immunizes them against claims of excessive force. The castle doctrine is not accepted in every jurisdic-
tion, but it was once common practice and continues to be on the books in many states. While only
instructive in the current inquiry, it helps to demonstrate a general attitude in the law that homeowners
should not have to brook intruders. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 508 (1896); United
States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236, n.92 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Beard v. United States, 158 U.S.
550, 562-64 (1895)).
56. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L.
REv. 101, 121-30 (2006).
57. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
58. Id. at 1014-15.
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the ability to speak or act more freely than he might in public)." She ar-
gues that property is a medium upon which individuals are able to express
themselves and this ability grants them liberties.60 Building on the Lock-
ean notions of the labor dessert theory, the person as a continuing con-
sciousness,61 and Hegelian ideas, the right to property being a function of
expressing one's will over it,62 Radin argues that property is necessary to
individuals' abilities to act on their desires and express their individuality
and that property allows individuals to attain some form of control over
their environment.6 3 People form relationships with objects to such an ex-
tent that the objects become a part of themselves rather than simply a fun-
gible thing.64 Radin demonstrates this point through her observations that
people may feel a sense of loss when they are separated from an object
(such as an heirloom or wedding ring) that is not erased merely by the
replacement of the object. 5
Takings cases demonstrate a form of recognition of the personhood
theory in the courts' favoring of object lost rather than wealth lost. Losing
a particular thing is seen as much more worthy of compensation rather than
an owner being subjected to conditions which lower the market value of
the thing.6 6 The object-loss can be translated directly to Bruce Ackerman's
view of property as a "bundle of rights," some combination of which is held
by the owner.6 7 Radin theorizes that part of the relationship between per-
sonhood and property is found in the continuity of relationships between
people and objects. This relationship is severed when one or more of the
sticks are taken from the owner, but it is not severed by a mere diminution
in value to the owner. 8 The taking of these sticks is disruptive to the
owner's life in a way wealth-loss is not, and Radin posits that the per-
sonhood perspective has substantial explanatory value for understanding
why physical takings are much more easily viewed as implicating the Fifth
Amendment than regulatory takings.
Radin looks particularly at the value of the home for the facilitation of
personal development and freedoms.6 9 The home serves as a place outside
59. Id. at 991-92.
60. Id. at 966-68.
61. Id. at 965, 967.
62. Id. at 971-74, 976.
63. Radin, supra note 57, at 986.
64. Id. at 959.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1003-04.
67. Id. at 1003. This view has also been approved by the Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). "The term 'property' as used in the Taking Clause includes the
entire group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]." Id. at 83n.6. "It is not used in the vulgar
and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized
by law." Id. "[Instead, it] denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it . . . . The constitutional provision is addressed to
every sort of interest the citizen may possess." Id. (internal citations omitted).
68. Radin, supra note 57, at 1003-04.
69. Id. at 991-92.
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of society for an individual to structure his private relations.7 0 The most
crucial aspect of the home that allows for this kind of personal develop-
ment is the home's private, protected quality and the right of the individual
to exclude others from it. The home may have its own sentimental value
that could not be replaced by another equal home, but the second equal
home would likely also be able to serve the function of providing its owner
the private space necessary for the development of the self. This special
quality inheres to the home's current status as a private place rather than
merely the individual's attachment to it.
Radin traces the special place of the home through different bodies of
case law, noting that its quality as a protected sphere is highly consistent
throughout. She notes the Court's protection of obscene materials found
within the home in Stanley v. Georgia." There, the court focuses on the
private nature of the home and the importance that individuals may take
whatever actions enable them to most completely express themselves, so
long as they do not affect other members of society.7 2 She looks to land-
lord-tenant disputes favoring tenants who have claimed the property as a
personal space, whereas it is purely a piece of property for the owners.
She then looks to criminal law, which has historically been extremely pro-
tective of the home, recognizing the "sanctity of the home."7  In Payton,
the Court found that an arrest made in the home carried "not only the
invasion attendant to all arrests,"7 ' but also upset the home's private space
in a manner impermissible without a warrant or exigent circumstances. An
individual gains a degree of safety by entering his home that he would not
have outside of it because of the "sanctity" of the place. The Court is rec-
ognizing a special characteristic possessed by the home which is recognized
in no other space under the law. Even when the Court is stripping away
the rights of searched parties, as in Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hay-
den,7 there is a clear understanding that the nature of the home as a pri-
vate space is not impacted by what is found within it. The Court will not
support the "mere evidence" rule because it finds no essential difference
between a search for contraband and a search for evidence to be used
against a defendant; the impact of being searched for the homeowner is the
same because of the piercing of the space."
Radin notes other cases granting special protections to the home in
zoning ordinances," but finds it anomalous that personhood has not
70. Id. at 997.
71. Id. at 991.
72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969).
73. Radin, supra note 57, at 992-96.
74. Id. at 996-1000.
75. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589.
76. Id. at 588-89.
77. 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967).
78. Radin, 34 STAN. L. REV. at 998-99. Protections for mere evidence are more firmly grounded
in self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth Amendment than in home protections in the Fourth.
79. Id. at 1005, n.172 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) ("where a plural-
ity found a substantive due process right to live in one's home with one's extended family, hence a
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emerged to give special protections to family homes in takings cases.8 0
However, that the lack of special protections for the home must be bal-
anced against the generally strong protections for physical property in the
takings regime and premiums above market often paid for homes and
other property with personal attachments.8 ' While the empirical practices
heightening the value of the home are not the same as judicial authoriza-
tion of this value, they support Radin's argument that this subjective value
of homes and other "special," non-commercial properties, is widely recog-
nized. Further, perhaps a push for valuing the subjective value of homes is
unnecessary because it is already widely accounted for in practice and addi-
tional recovery beyond what has already been voluntarily paid would not
be forthcoming (or at least not greater than the costs of litigation).8 2 Also,
perhaps takings law does not favor the home over other sorts of physical
space because by the time the home is taken, much of the home's value as a
protector of privacy has already been stripped.
The harm in the home search suffered by the owner comes not only
from the discovery of contraband, but also from the discovery of whatever
else the homeowner prefers to keep only within the private sphere. The
protections Radin cites help to create this sphere of privacy for intimate
relations but also recognize some quality of home beyond its closed-off
nature:
It is not just that liberty needs some sanctuary and the home is a logi-
cal one to choose because of social consensus. There is also the feeling that
it would be an insult for the state to invade one's home because it is the
scene of one's history and future, one's life and growth. In other words,
one embodies or constitutes oneself there. The home is affirmatively part
of oneself-property for personhood-and not just the agreed-on locale
for protection from outside interference."
The sentiment that an invasion of the home is an "insult" is echoed in
Loretto, one of a small number of partial takings cases.84
B. Application of the Personhood Theory to Fourth Amendment Takings
Radin's analysis supports the current state of ambiguity as to the
proper role for property and privacy as sources of protection for the home
in different bodies of law. Her argument that property may have a dual
value, both as a tradable asset and as a more specific reflection of the
substantive due process limitation on the power of local government to zone for occupancy by nuclear
families only.").
80. She does, however, note that some special protections for group rights in takings cases can be
found in Indian law. Radin, 34 STAN. L. REv at 1006.
81. See Garnett, supra note 56. Tracing the history of takings cases in Chicago, Garnett finds that
generally, governmental authorities seizing properties go to great lengths to avoid taking properties of
high subjective value. Id. at 110-11. Further, she finds that many states and localities have instituted
rules to pay property owners more than the value of their property, either through statutes mandating
this treatment, or through high payouts of discretionary relocation assistance funding. Id. at 121-22.
82. Id.
83. Radin, supra note 57, at 992.
84. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
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owner's desires and personality, is a powerful one and has a significant in-
tuitive resonance and considerable value in explaining the law's treatment
of the home. The home is frequently an individual's most substantial in-
vestment but it is also a private, protected sphere for the individual outside
of society. It is the site of an individual's intimate and family interactions
and it is a location safe from prying eyes and government intrusions.
Radin works through the personal attachment to property in the tak-
ings law in particular." Object-loss is more significant to personhood than
wealth-loss because wealth-loss relates to the value society places on pos-
sessions and is definitionally monetizable (even if imperfectly so)." How-
ever, an individual's personal valuation of an object may be totally
unaffected by the wealth-loss suffered; if he had no plans to sell the object,
the fact that others now value it less makes no difference to his enjoyment
of it. Object-loss or loss of a particular right of use to the object has a
different quality to it, as the taking is more distinctly related to an individ-
ual's connection to the object. For example, one would be more harmed by
full payment in exchange for the government's seizure of one's wedding
ring than by a price cap on the resale of rings which made the ring much
less valuable. Physical space is highly specific and infungible; it necessarily
involves the taking of "this" house or property, fitting Radin's definition of
object-loss. The qualities of takings law which the personhood theory best
explains have clear application to searches. The problem in searches is not
that the home suffers a diminution in value, but instead that the residents
have lost a discrete interest in the property: the right to exclude others
from the home. This is the sort of "stick" that takings law would find easy
to conceptualize as an object-loss harm and compensate.
Criminal law's typically strong protections of the home reinforce the
notion that the sanctity of the home may not be breached for mere trifles
or suspicions, but instead only upon the issuance of a warrant. Unlike tak-
ings law, criminal law has taken much more of a concern for the notions of
protected spaces and privacy because it deals with spaces that are still in-
habited at the time of the law's interactions with them. The purported shift
in Katz towards protecting privacy rather than property rights is a recogni-
tion of personhood theory; it protects the owner's subjective value of prop-
erty, which is at least partially the privacy it affords. The space is made
private by an individual's expectation of privacy, which is deeply linked to
his attachment to the object.
Radin's argument, that part of the value of the home is grounded in
the expressions of personhood it allows, helps to explain the nature of the
loss suffered by a home search. The harm suffered by the owner is beyond
the mere "rent" value of the property during the time of the physical
seizure of the home; the harm is in the violation felt by having the privacy
85. Radin, supra note 57, at 1002-13.
86. Id. at 1003-06.
87. Id. at 1000n.159.
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of the home compromised, and the subjective benefits of the home's pri-
vacy are severely damaged. This harm cannot be measured solely in terms
of the value of the home and the time over which it is seized, but instead in
the revelation of years of private materials and personal information. Be-
cause the nature of the harm is in the allowance of unwanted intruders into
the home, the harm has a greater relationship to the depth of the search
and the exposure of private materials to numerous outsiders than the
length of time the home is seized.
While this harm does not look exactly like the harms of traditional
takings cases, it is no less real. The subjective and objective values of prop-
erty are not the same, and the subjective value will always be far more
difficult to properly evaluate. However, even if police actions would not
eliminate the value of the property to the general public, they undermine
the purpose of possessing the property for the owners who are searched.
In this sense, the "rent" system of compensation is a poor one, as the harm
comes more from the values inuring to property than in tangible harms to
market value. In the absence of a good system of valuing subjective loss,
the use of objective loss seems to be a sufficient (if crude) substitute. It
would likely still undervalue the harm suffered by the owners by paying
them for the temporary use of the space, but would provide at least a first
pass at compensating them for the harm suffered; at least some of the value
of the privacy the property affords would be incorporated into society's
market prices. Though the police actions do not damage the proxies for
the value of property, they go directly to the underlying value and the rea-
son for property.
IV. TAKINGS LAW AND PROPERTY CLAIMS
A typical home search will often include police officers entering a
home, either upon the owner's opening the door for them or after the door
has been broken down due to the owner's refusal or absence. The officers
conduct the search pursuant to a warrant which gives them the right to
search the entire home or specific areas of the home. The owners may
remain in the home for the duration of the search but may not interfere
with the officers' business and the officers may remain in the home for
however long is necessary for them to accomplish their purpose. The
search likely occurs because the owner's home contains some evidence nec-
essary for a criminal investigation or trial.
Although such a home search has not yet been recognized as a taking,
it takes very little imagination to conceive of a forced entry into the home
by a law enforcement agency as a taking. A physical taking is conceptually
simple: it must be a (1) physical occupation (2) for a public purpose." A
home search in which law enforcement agents enter into a dwelling by right
88. Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 413-14 (Fed. Cl. 1996). In physical takings cases,
the inquiry is limited to whether claimant can establish physical occupation, not necessarily of infinite
duration, of his property by government. Physical occupation need not occur directly, but can be found
in physical injury to real property substantially contributed to by public improvement.
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of a warrant directing them to search for evidence or contraband, satisfies
the two requirements. The key element which makes a government action
fall under the purview of the Takings Clause is the forced submission of
property owners to invasion by the government.8 9 The above home search
involves an involuntary physical intrusion into the space designated in the
warrant, akin to a kind of per se taking.9 0
When a government action effects a physical intrusion, the Court is
extremely inclined to find a taking has occurred. In demonstrating the de-
cisiveness of the physical aspect of the taking, the majority in Loretto cites
to two cases where the government interfered with the use of mines during
times of war.91 In United States v. Pewee Coal, the government actually
took over a mine for over a year, then extended its ownership twice.92 In
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,93 the government ordered that
"nonessential gold mines" be shut down in order to preserve resources for
the war effort. Both cases stemmed from measures passed during World
War II. The former was found to be a clear taking,9 4 (with the dissent argu-
ing only as to whether damages of sufficient heft had been shown) 9 5 and
the latter was found by eight justices not to be a taking.96 The length of
time the regulation was in effect was far from the controlling question as to
whether the government had effected a taking; instead, the close resem-
blance to a physical invasion in one but not in the other was dispositive. 97
The differences between a home search and a more typical taking are
not in the barebones definition or in the fact of the physical intrusion, but
instead in the qualities of the property rights taken. A standard takings
case generally involves the full, permanent seizure of a piece of land or
structure, because the particular parcel of land is needed indefinitely for
some other use.98 This may be achieved either through condemnation pro-
ceedings, if the character of the structure or land is such that it causes the
property to be taken (such as for health or safety reasons in the case of a
dilapidated building or slum),9 9 or through inverse condemnation if the
89. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527 (holding that "the Takings Clause requires compensation if the gov-
ernment authorizes a compelled physical invasion of property").
90. This would be in contrast to a regulatory taking, in which the harm is suffered in terms of the
value of the home or limitations on the specific purposes the homeowners intend for the space. See Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
91. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431-32.
92. 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951).
93. 357 U.S. 155, 156-57 (1958).
94. Pewee Coal, 341 U.S. at 115-17.
95. Id. at 121-22 (Burton, J., dissenting).
96. Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 168-69.
97. Pewee Coal, 341 U.S. 114; Central Eureka, 357 U.S. 155.
98. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003); Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). See also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925); Rindge Co. v. L.A. County, 262
U.S. 700 (1923); Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); Kelo v. City
of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 496-98 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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land has no intrinsic faults but merely sits on a site needed for other pur-
poses, such as a highway.100
I make no claim that having a home searched is equal to losing the
home outright, but there is no requirement that the government must take
all of an owner's rights to his property in order to effect a taking. 0' Bruce
Ackerman describes how property rights may be viewed as "a bundle of
rights," and notes that the court frequently recognizes takings where any of
the "sticks" in the bundle have been taken from the owner.102 Property
rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights "to possess, use
and dispose of it."' 03 To the extent that the government permanently occu-
pies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights. Home
searches take two of these rights for their duration, possession and use.
Many characteristics of a search might differentiate it from a more typical
taking: the incomplete nature of the invasion; the abbreviated, indefinite
period of time over which the search occurs; the owner's ability to be in the
home during the search; and the owner's culpability in causing the home to
be entered. However, none of these factors individually cause any sort of
hand-wringing for justices when they occur in other takings cases because
they do not go to the heart of whether an invasion is or is not a taking. I
will go through each of these concerns, demonstrating their irrelevance in
determining whether a taking has occurred upon a physical invasion.
A. Partial Physical Takings
The fact that the home search may not encompass the entire home
would not disqualify it from being a taking based on well-established inter-
pretations of the Fifth Amendment. The courts have recognized takings in
cases of permanent partial physical invasion where the government de-
stroys the right to use only a piece of the property. "A permanent physical
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the
public interests that it may serve."1 0 4 Loretto set a profound precedent
showing the strong protection given to the physical space of the home, no
matter how it was violated.' Even a slight incursion, such as cable wires
in the walls, which seemed to have little intrusion onto the private space of
the home or the privacy interests of the residents of the apartment build-
ing,106 was found to be a compensable taking. The small extent of the in-
trusion factored only into the compensation awarded, not into whether a
violation had occurred.'1 Unlike in the regulatory takings cases, it was not
necessary to make a measurement of whether the government had gone
100. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943). See also, United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), cited in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
101. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. 419; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
102. BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrUTION, 113-67 (1977).
103. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
104. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.
105. Id. at 435-37.
106. Id. at 422-24.
107. Id. at 437-38.
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"too far" in using the space of the home, as any incursion was sufficient to
constitute an invasion. This interpretation has not been challenged in any
way in the years following Loretto. 0s In Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United
States,109 the Federal Circuit found that when the Navy seized a warehouse
it had previously leased to a contractor, it committed a taking merely by
"breaking and entering .. . after the Navy forced the doors, SKI no longer
controlled access. The Navy took SKI's property."110 The status of this en-
try as a taking was also unaffected by the limited duration of the taking and
SKI's continued access to taken property.'11
B. Easements and the Right of Exclusive Use
The right to exclude others from property has always been viewed as
an important "stick" in the bundle of property rights, and when the govern-
ment forces an owner to allow others onto his land, it effects a physical
taking. Takings cases dealing with public easements involve forcing the
owner to give up his right of exclusion over his property but do not take
away his right to be present on his land and theoretically cause a limited
amount of damage.'12 Easements differ from the home search in that they
are generally permanent or at least long-term arrangements rather than
one-time entrances onto the property, but also merely involve passage over
outdoor portions of the property, rather than through the more intimate
space of the home. While it is impossible to determine precisely how these
opposing factors might weigh against each other, it is worth noting that
easement cases are clear-cut in the eyes of the law."' A pregnable prop-
erty simply has less value to the owner than one over which he has sole
dominion because other individuals now have a legitimate right to use his
land. These claims are for a limited purpose and period of time, but the
land is no longer entirely his so long as others desire to use it." 4 Other
108. Yee, 503 U.S. at 520; F.C.C. v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987); Fresh Pond Shopping
Ctr., Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983).
109. 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 1583.
111. Id.
112. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (involving only the right of citizens to walk across his beachfront
property: the only damage to the land ought to have been as a result of individuals walking across
sand); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (where the public at large would have been allowed to use the
plaintiff's waterway, presumably without any meaningful damage to the pond).
113. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 ("Requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment."); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947)
("Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an
extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course
of time."); Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Dickinson, 331
U.S. at 748) ("It is well established that the government may not take an easement without just
compensation).
114. The taking here could be conceptualized as akin the taking seen in Loretto, in that a portion
of the land is no longer under the control of user for intermittent periods. Instead of taking possession
of a discrete physical bundle of the land, the government has instead taken the land over the space of
time. Either way, the significant act for the Court is the entrance onto the land, rather than the specific
duration of the intrusion (though it seems clear both in the easements and in Loretto, the Court concep-
tualizes the intrusions as likely to extend for a substantial amount of time.) Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
2009]1 21
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
cases establish that a taking need not be continuous but, looking to the
laws of easements, find that intermittent intrusions may suffice to demon-
strate a taking over a longer period of time. 1 Thus, an individual whose
home is seized on several occasions might claim that his home has never
been truly surrendered back to him.
The loss of the exclusion right alone is seen as taking away a key factor
in the owner's enjoyment of the land, necessitating compensation. The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most trea-
sured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.1 6 Cases requiring
that owners waive their rights to exclusion for very specific purposes or
intrusions are seen as particularly egregious."' 7 Both Loretto and Skip
Kirchdorfer are clear that the loss of the right to exclusive use of property
by no means requires that an individual cannot use the property himself;
indeed, in Loretto, the residents had seemingly unfettered access to nearly
all uses of their property.1 s The loss of exclusive use of property is com-
plete when an individual loses the right to exclude whomever he wishes
and thus, the fact that owners continue to have some rights to the use of
their property during a home search does not negate the diminution of
their right of exclusive use.
The Court's analysis of the differences between PruneYard Shopping
Center"9 and Kaiser Aetna demonstrates how the value of the right to ex-
clusive use is fundamentally tied to the owner's protection of that right.
Both involve the government's promulgating regulations which would
force private property owners to allow citizens onto their properties over
the owners' objections. In PruneYard, a group of students wanted to raise
awareness of Zionism inside a large shopping mall and the mall owners
wanted to prevent their doing so. The state forced the mall to grant access
to the students over the mall's protests. The Court found that while "there
has literally been a 'taking' of" the right to exclude others from a property,
it did not amount to a taking in a constitutional sense.120 The Court found
the controlling standard was from Armstrong, looking to whether private
individuals had been forced "to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."12 1 In finding the
mall has not been unreasonably deprived by the regulation, the determina-
tive factor in PruneYard had not been forced to bear such a burden was the
general openness of the mall. The Court mentions the mall is "open to the
public at large," that it is "a large commercial complex," and that the
115. Skip Kirchdorfer, 6 F.3d 1573; Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
116. Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 ("[Tjhe 'right to exclude' is
doubtless[ly] . .. , 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property."')). See also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
117. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
118. Id. at 422-24; ACKERMAN, supra note 102.
119. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
120. Id. at 82.
121. Id. at 83.
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speakers' activities were "limited . . . to the common areas of the shopping
center."122
In contrast, the Court paints the property opened to the public in Kai-
ser Aetna as a "private pond," 1 2 3 open only to fee-paying members and the
fees were paid in part to "maintain the privacy and security of the pond." 124
These cases are otherwise strikingly similar in the character of government
action, except that the mall's essential purpose required it to be open to the
general public, while the value of the pond in Kaiser Aetna depended on its
use being limited. The Court freely admits Pruneyard's right to exclusive
use was taken, but it finds no real value in this right; the mall was not a
private space, so the right to exclusive use was of no value.125 This is in
striking contrast to the very clear-cut decision in Kaiser Aetna where the
Court does not find the taking to be a close call due to the private nature of
the space.126 The home's status as a private and exclusive space is far bet-
ter protected than in either of the above examples and thus, the taking of
the right to exclusive use ought to be a clear taking.
C. Duration of the Taking
Taking property for a period of limited rather than permanent dura-
tion bears only on the compensation owed rather than the status of the
taking. "[C]ompensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the
government occupies the property for its own purposes, even though that
use is temporary."' 27 Cases involving temporary takings of factory and
production facilities where the government would take over the lease of a
factory for a period of a year or two in order to satisfy the production
demands of the war effort under the War Powers Act amply demonstrate
this proposition.12 8 The fights in these cases are about what sort of com-
pensation is owed to the former possessors of the properties (whether dam-
ages should be merely for the value of the property or also for the lost
income the factories might have produced over the relevant period), not
about whether these were takings at all.'29 While these factories were
taken for a much longer time than a property is seized during a home
search, the principle remains that a seizure known to be of a limited dura-
tion where the property will be returned to the owner, is a taking. Courts
have also applied this standard to cases such as Loretto and Hendler v.
122. Id. at 83-84.
123. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 166.
124. Id. at 168.
125. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84-4.
126. Radin, supra note 57, at 983n.190. Even public accommodations can suffer takings for not
being able to exclude whomever they want to.
127. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. at 233-34 (citing General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)). See also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1 (1949); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Yuba Natural
Res., Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638, 642 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (just compensation for a temporary taking
based on the term of the taking).
128. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373; Petty Motor, 327 U.S. 372.
129. General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378-79; Petty Motor, 327 U.S. at 374-75.
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United States,1"o stating that in the context of some physical object being
placed upon an individual's land, "'permanent' does not mean forever, or
anything like it. A taking can be for a limited term-what is 'taken' is, in the
language of real property law, an estate for years, that is, a term of finite
duration as distinct from the infinite term of an estate in fee simple abso-
lute.""' The time limitations only effect the payments owed to the owner
rather than the status of the action.
The one exception to this general rule is the surveying of lands already
marked to be taken at a later date. These entrances only fail to require the
procurement of an easement or takings payments when the entrance poses
no damage to the land and does not interfere with the owner's possession
of the land.' 3 2 This conclusion supports the view of a home search as a
taking; the presence of law enforcement officials searching a home much
more closely resembles extracting rock samples from land than taking sim-
ple measurements without causing damage. The process is a violent one
which disrupts the ability of owners to use the home and courts have found
analogously jarring experiences sufficient to constitute takings in other
contexts.
D. Culpability in the Taking
Physical takings questions are set apart from peripheral matters. They
are issues of property and are parsed as such without a broader concern for
the relationship between the government's action in the particular case and
individual from whom property is taken. Condemnation of slums in order
to make more productive use of the land or area pose routine takings cases,
but the only real question in those cases is whether the purpose of the
government in seizing these buildings to give them to another private entity
is an acceptable reason for condemnation. Whether the slumlord deserves
payment for seizing his property after allowing it to become so run-down
130. 952 F.2d at 1376.
131. Id.; see also Skip Kirchdorfer, 6 F.3d at 1582.
132. For limited surveys incident to condemnation proceedings, courts have not found a taking
necessarily occurs. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Joseph W. Wolfskill Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. App. 4th
1963); State By Waste Mgmt Bd. v. Bruesehoff, 343 N.W. 2d 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Cleveland
Bakers Union v. State, Dept. of Admin. Services-Pub. Works, 43 N.E.2d 999 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
However, where substantial interference occurs, courts may find a taking based on preliminary actions
to a later, more complete taking. See Mo. Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Eilers, 729 S.W.2d 471,
473-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (entering private property, drilling holes, and removing soil, without con-
sent of the landowner, amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the property; the soil survey could not
be conducted until the Commission received permission from the landowner or " intiates judicial pro-
ceedings and pays the damages for a temporary easement before entering the land"). See also 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 88 (2008).
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that it posed a menace to public health and safety is not an issue;'3 3 the fact
of the physical invasion is more than sufficient to prove the taking.134
Kaiser Aetna establishes that even if an owner's actions make him far
more susceptible to a taking or bring his possessions under government
regulations, allowing any sort of public right of access onto his property is
still a taking. Kaiser Aetna made substantial repairs and improvements to
its property, which transformed its pond into a navigable waterway.135
Navigable waterways fall under the auspices of the federal government and
as such, the government sought to clarify whether it had the right to do
what it saw fit with the developed land. However, what it wished to do
(build an aquatic park partially made of Kaiser Aetna's property) would
have affected an easement upon the property by allowing the general pub-
lic to use the waterway. Though the case was technically a regulatory tak-
ings case, the Court saw the government's actions as a clear invasion of
Kaiser Aetna's property interest in the waterway, "even if the Government
physically invades only an easement in property."' 3 6 Even though Kaiser
Aetna could have avoided any question in this case simply by failing to
improve its waterway through dredging, thus precluding it from being con-
sidered a "navigable waterway," its property interests in the waterway were
undiminished.' The fact the Kaiser Aetna brought the regulation upon
itself was not seen as a relevant question in this litigation.
I do not believe that the "reasonable investment-backed expectations"
prong of the regulatory takings doctrine, showing that a property owner's
intentions should be weighed in the calculations of whether a taking has
occurred, 3 s would alter this balance. In regulatory takings cases, individu-
als seek to receive payment after being prevented from using property in
the way they intend to use it. The concern addressed by the reasonable
investment-backed expectations prong is that landowners may attempt to
use the takings doctrine to obtain a windfall from the government by
purchasing land which may be subject to regulation, only to receive the
133. The only real area where takings concerns itself with the culpability of the property owner in
bringing about the taking is in the regulatory takings arena in questions of reasonable investment-
backed expectations. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. United States, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). There, courts
take some concern for whether the property owner was willfully blind to the likelihood of regulation,
and possibly purchased the property in hopes of receiving a windfall from the government. It is not
enough to have committed any wrongdoing (neglecting a building such that it becomes a menace), but
the offense needs to relate specifically to the property in question and represent some sort of attempt to
reap gains which are not deserved. It seems unlikely to be a problem in the proposed home search
takings that individuals would hide contraband in their homes in the hope that the government would
search and give them a payment; the amounts of money and criminal charges involved would simply
make this a losing proposition.
134. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984); Berman, 348
U.S. at 28-37; Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975).
135. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168.
136. Id. at 180.
137. Id. at 185-86.
138. Supra note 133. Generally, regulatory takings are much less permissive than physical takings;
the courts have less concern for fluctuations in the market value of property, which is already erratic,
than for any sort of physical encroachment. See, e.g., Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. at 233. I will set
this concern aside for the sake of argument.
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takings payments granted when the regulation comes to pass, rather than
put the land to productive use. This worry would not arise for searched
individuals. Presumably, people involved in criminal activities would not
want their homes searched and their activities discovered. They would not
attempt to abuse the takings system but to the contrary, would hope to
have no relationship with the criminal justice system. While some may
think that wrongdoing negates a taking, the question of the moral dessert
of the invasion is simply not one asked in the takings context.
E. Trespass
Though the corpus of tort law is distinct from both criminal and tak-
ings law, it is important to at least take a brief look at trespass law. 9 The
tort of trespass helps to illustrate the argument that entering onto a prop-
erty is recognized under the law as creating a compensable harm for the
property owner. Consider the Restatement (First) of Torts § 163, which
speaks to trespasses that result in no physical damage to the property:
One who intentionally enters land in the possession of an-
other without the consent of the possessor or other privilege
so to do, is liable for a trespass under the rule stated in
§ 158, although his presence on the land causes no harm to
the land, its possessor or to any thing or person in whose
security the possessor has a legally protected interest.1 4 0
The notion that harm is caused merely by presence and the violation
of exclusive use, is another uncontroversial notion under the current legal
principles. This provision for tort damages is a clear recognition that the
loss of exclusive use alone is sufficient to cause some injury to the property
owner in the absence of any tangible harm. While the legal stance of law
enforcement officers entering property pursuant to a warrant is distinct in
that they have the privilege to enter, they still fail to enter at the consent of
the owner. From the perspective of the homeowner, the uninvited law en-
forcement officer bears a strong resemblance to the uninvited trespasser,
with the distinction that the homeowner has no power to ward off or re-
move the law enforcement officer. The privilege to enter is taken from the
possessor unwillingly and thus, the same harms apply. The notion that
harm is done by a trespasser even when no specific monetary damage is
achieved by his trespasser is well-settled in tort law.
139. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 158 defines the tort of trespass as follows: "One who
intentionally and without a consensual or other privilege (a) enters land in possession of another or any
part thereof or causes a thing or third person so to do, or (b) remains thereon, or (c) permits to remain
thereon a thing which the actor or his predecessor in legal interest brought thereon in the manner
stated in §§ 160 and 161, is liable as a trespasser to the other irrespective of whether harm is thereby
caused to any of his legally protected interests."
140. Id.
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F. Conclusion
While it is clear that none of these cases involve a very close approxi-
mation of a home search, all of the qualities which might set a home search
apart from more traditional takings cases are not considered controversial
by courts, or even close cases. These are all settled questions of law and
the mere combination of them, while novel, does not alter the fundamen-
tally similar character of the search to recognized takings. While the home
search does not look the same as the taking of a home to build a new
roadway, the case law on point does not allow for a clear legal ground upon
which this sort of invasion could be differentiated from a standard tak-
ing.141 It is not enough to point to incomplete seizure of the home, contin-
ued use by the owner, limited duration of the search, or possible culpability
of the owner. These are simply not issues that come into play in determin-
ing whether or not a taking has occurred.
The home search looks most like an easement into the home, a partic-
ularly damaging sort of easement. As the Supreme Court noted in Loretto:
[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger
directly invades and occupies the owner's property . . . .
[P]roperty law has long protected an owner's expectation
that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the posses-
sion of his property. To require, as well, that the owner per-
mit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds
insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is qualita-
tively more severe than a regulation of the use of property,
even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the
owner, since the owner may have no control over the tim-
ing, extent, or nature of the invasion.' 42
The Supreme Court describes precisely the nature of the harm suf-
fered by an easement or partial physical taking: the owner is not removed
from his property entirely and he is not paid for the full value of his home
so that he may go and find another home that he may have to himself.
Instead, he is forced to share his home (the injury) with another entity not
of his choosing (the insult). The Court highlights here that a principal ben-
efit of property is found in its private quality and when unwanted others
are allowed in, the loss is not trifling. Justice Marshall uses strong language
in this passage to illustrate the damage caused by any sort of physical inva-
sion. The injury is particularly profound when the homeowner has no
power to stop the officers from looking into the most private areas of the
home and cannot prepare himself in any way for the invasion. This is a far
141. While the cases on point, particularly Loretto, often stress that the recognized case law for
takings relate to a permanent intrusion, they notably have not ruled out shorter time frames. Loretto,
458 U.S. at 428-29 (noting that some older cases involving temporary flooding of land were found not
to constitute takings).
142. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436; see also Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252-53.
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greater form of the injury than the one in Loretto, where the owner merely
had to submit to wires in his walls. The wires did not transmit any informa-
tion about the home and before any installation occurred, the owner had
the opportunity to secure the private areas of the home. Neither the ease-
ment in Nollan nor the cable company's installation of wires in Loretto was
accompanied by anything remotely resembling the violence of a home
search.
Due to the lack of warning and inability of those searched to prepare
for the invasion into the private space - another factor that differentiates a
search from a traditional taking - the search poses a stronger argument for
compensation because it takes away not only some monetary interest in the
physical property, but also a large measure of the owner-specific value of
the property. In this way, a search is also akin to a trespass. Though it
lacks the illegality of a normal trespass (at least in the cases of warranted
searches), the fact that the harm of intrusion is compensated in tort law
even when it does not result in damage, or an effective seizure of the prop-
erty trespassed upon, is telling. There is a recognition under the law of the
psychic harms of an uninvited individual invading personal space.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Home Searches as Takings
A physical taking is any intrusion onto property mandated by the gov-
ernment rather than allowed by the property owner. This standard has a
long history and has been highly resistant to allowing any entry, no matter
how slight, without compensation. Because the takings inquiry is such an
arid one, looking solely to whether an individual's property rights have
been violated, there is a strong argument for finding that a taking occurs in
a home search. The primary differences between the typical takings cases
and home searches are found in the duration of the taking and the nature
of the space intruded upon. We are not used to compensating for injuries
to privacy as takings so it may be more difficult to view the home search as
such, but takings granted for violating the right to exclusive use of a prop-
erty bridge the gap between what we are used to recognizing as a taking
and the taking which occurs in a search.
What has truly been lost in a home search is the sense of privacy and
personhood invested in the home. This more amorphous concept is not
directly recognized as a compensable harm under the law of property, but
it is encapsulated by the loss of exclusive use of one's property. The value
of exclusive use is more difficult to define than many other strands of prop-
erty rights; it does not imply the owner has lost the primacy of his use of
the land nor any alteration of the land's physical characteristics. Instead,
Radin best describes its true value as the owner's subjective valuation of
his ability to exercise his privacy rights and to fully control his personal
space in whatever way he sees fit. In cases such as Loretto, the court is
profoundly offended by the intrusion into the physical area of the home,
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even when there is essentially no attendant loss of privacy.' 43 Similarly, the
Court's reluctance to allow any sort of physical entrance into the home in
the Fourth Amendment context, or any sort of surveillance which reveals
the intimate details of the home, bespeaks the value of this privacy. If the
Court did not think people found any value in the privacy of their homes, it
would not be so stringent in protecting the home's boundaries.144 While
not everything of value has a price under the law, the value of exclusive use
clearly does under takings law. Because the exclusive use of the home is
lost in such a violent and profound manner, the entry into the home causes
a taking of non-trivial magnitude.
B. Why Might Home Searches Be Different?
1. Claimants' Culpability
Unlike in takings cases, where the government's desire to take the
claimant's property is almost always unrelated to any other characteristic of
the claimant's, claimants in a Fourth Amendment taking would not be so
innocent. In order to obtain a search warrant, the police must have proba-
ble cause to believe that the space to be searched has contraband or evi-
dence of criminal activities. While the individual owning the home may not
have committed a crime, he may not have entirely clean hands. Many
would argue the home search is an acceptable cost to put upon the class of
criminal suspects, who in turn impose costs on society through their crimi-
nal activities.
This concern does not hold up because criminal suspects have not been
found guilty of any crime and because takings law is disinterested in the
culpability of claimants. Searched individuals are suspects, not convicts,
and the home search forces them to bear a cost without any process or
opportunity to resist. While some might argue this cost is akin to court
costs or attorneys' fees, which are routinely imposed on people not found
guilty of any crime, I suggest two key differences: the waivability and mon-
etary nature of those payments. While people may become attached to
their money, loss of general, non-specific assets carries with it none of the
highly specific and unchangeable losses carried by an invasion of one's pri-
vacy. This is recognized in takings law, which provides my second counter-
argument that only regulatory takings look to the question of how an ac-
tor's conduct played into his loss. Regulatory takings law has a similar sus-
picion of its claimants, who are often investors who have mere expectations
in their property rather than personal ties, or may have been gambling
against the regulation and attempting to cash in either way. For questions
of physical takings though, the inquiry ends upon the entrance into the
building. Kaiser Aetna and cases dealing with the condemnation of slums
provide strong support for this proposition: but for the owner's actions, the
143. It is possible this is due to a cross-fertilization between the laws of property and criminal law.
Criminal law takes a substantial concern for the inviolability of property, protecting the home in partic-
ular from criminal searches.
144. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41.
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government would have had no authority over the property. The question
of whether these owners deserved to have their rights of exclusive use
taken was simply not on the table. Physical takings cases are based on
property rights alone, not on a holistic inquiry into who deserved to have
their property taken from them.
2. Limitations of Constitutional Rights
A constitutional analog to the above-stated concern would be that
nearly all constitutional rights are subject to some limits; they are not abso-
lute where important government interests cannot be accomplished in any
other way. For example, the First Amendment states that Congress shall
make no law abridging free speech, but yields to numerous exceptions
when government ends of protecting public safety cannot be accomplished
through the preservation of the right, such as fighting words and threats.
The government cannot protect its people without conducting criminal in-
vestigations, and it cannot accomplish these investigations without searches
of particular homes. The right to property and compensation for seizure of
property is not infinite and should carve out an exception when important
government interests are implicated.
The government's interest in protecting safety is not necessarily
greater than other interests which are accomplished by property seizures
under the Takings Clause. The government must take actions all the time
through the use of its police power which involve seizing property (such as
condemning slums, taking homes to build roads or public utilities) and
compensates these seizures as clear takings. The government's interests in
providing services and protecting its citizens from blight are not of a funda-
mentally different character or importance from its interests in protecting
them from crime. They are all part of the government's mission to pro-
mote its citizens' general welfare. The government would still be able to
protect its citizens if it had to pay for its use of private property, it would
only increase the cost of the protection.145 Neither the government inter-
ests nor the harms suffered are of such a different type from a typical tak-
ing that they would warrant differentiation and an exception to the general
right.
3. Mere Evidence Rule/Government's Right to the Property
Older cases dealing with home searches only allowed the seizure of
contraband, as individuals were seen as having no legitimate property
rights to such materials, but prevented the seizure of "mere evidence" or
other materials in the individual's possession that might be used as evi-
dence that a crime had been committed, but the ownership of which was
not illegal.14 6 The Supreme Court eliminated this distinction in Warden v.
Hayden, finding the government could seize whatever evidence it needed
145. This stands in stark contrast to threats cases, in which the harm is achieved merely through
the speech in question.
146. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 300-04.
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to prove the crime had occurred.147 Due to this permission, some might
argue that home searches cannot be viewed as takings because the govern-
ment is entering the home only to extract materials to which it has obtained
a controlling property interest. The government could compel the produc-
tion of this information through subpoena, but the targets of searches can-
not be trusted to produce the incriminating information sought. Thus, the
government is taking only the actions necessary to preserve its own prop-
erty interests.
My argument is not that the government must compensate for the
seizure of contraband or evidence, but instead that it inflicts harm by enter-
ing the intimate space of the home. The government's choice to enter the
home uninvited with a search warrant to recover the objects sought is most
likely a sensible one (as I agree using a subpoena would likely have limited
effectiveness in most cases), but the fact remains that the government's
choice to improve the efficacy of its evidence-gathering process through the
home search imposes the cost of the physical invasion upon the subjects of
the search. The subjects never had the opportunity to avoid the cost of the
search because of the government's unilateral decision to accomplish the
evidence-gathering in that manner. Thus, the subjects cannot then be
blamed for the cost because of the government's assumptions that they
would destroy the evidence. Despite the government's claims to the evi-
dence in the home, it takes far more than the objects sought by the search
warrant when it physically enters a home and exposes its private contents
to uninvited people.
4. Consonance Between Fourth and Fifth Amendments
A strictly originalist reading of the Constitution would certainly bar
my argument: home searches were not recognized as takings at the adop-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, nor at any point since, for that matter. How-
ever, a non-originalist but constitutionalist challenge might assert that
viewing searches as takings would be precluded because it would create
dissonance between the Fourth Amendment's bar to unreasonable
searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. This ar-
gument would suggest that the Fourth Amendment, having already spoken
directly to the issue of home searches, would be the controlling constitu-
tional authority for questions relating to them. The language in the Fourth
Amendment does not mention payments, nor suggest that searches may be
conducted after payment, but merely that citizens are to be free of unrea-
sonable and unwarranted searches. The silence on reasonable searches as-
signs the government the right to conduct searches without restraints (such
as payment). The Fifth Amendment was not written to deal with home
searches and does not speak to them directly, and given that there is al-
ready specific language speaking to home searches which do not paint them
147. Id. at 307-08.
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as takings, it cannot be mere oversight that home searches have not been
seen as a taking.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect fundamentally different in-
terests, which would not become discordant if takings were extended to
home searches. The Fourth Amendment is an absolute protection for citi-
zens to be free from unreasonable searches; the government may never
search unreasonably. The framers did not elaborate as to many aspects of
how searches may be accomplished, failing to lay out which circumstances
create probable cause and what limits govern those conducting a search.
The government has broad powers to conduct reasonable, warranted
searches, much as it has the power to take property it deems necessary to
the accomplishment of some public purpose by eminent domain. The pur-
pose of the Takings Clause is not to prevent the government from seizing
property (or, as per my argument, searching homes), but instead to ensure
that adequate compensation is given when it does. The Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibitions could be read as more akin to preventing otherwise
illegal takings (such as takings for a purely private purpose) than as barring
compensation. My argument does not implicate the Fourth Amendment,
as it would serve not to exclude evidence or prevent the search, but merely
allows the homeowner to recover damages for the actual harms the search
imposed. This reading to create greater harmony among the amendments,
as compensating under the Fifth Amendment for home searches, would
simply treat physical intrusions conducted pursuant to criminal law in the
same way other intrusions are treated rather than creating an unwritten
exception to the Takings Clause for law enforcement interests.
5. Takings Are Ill-Suited to Compensate the Harm Found in Home
Searches
Typical takings pose only a limited intrusion to property as it exists as
a private space. Takings are not accomplished suddenly or without warn-
ing. Ample notice is given before the potential trespass occurs, usually
with the individual suffering the taking having time to appeal the decision
before it is effected. While government takings may frequently result in
the loss of an object valued for the privacy it granted to the owner, they
allow the owner time to modify his behavior in such a way that the space is
no longer private when the right to exclusion is lost. The owner's senti-
mental connection with the home remains, which alone is perhaps worthy
of greater compensation, but the home's role as a private space has likely
now been transferred to a new space. The owner has been able to, in a
sense, take the private space to another physical location.
Criminal searches almost definitionally do not allow for this modifica-
tion time. The Fourth Amendment is protective of a broader range of
property interests than is takings law, recognizing a use-based property in-
terest for individuals who have no permanent claim to the space they are
in. For example, if the government was to seize a phone booth by eminent
domain, none of the regular users of that booth would have a takings claim
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because they have been deprived of a space they were once free to inhabit;
they would, however, have a Fourth Amendment claim if their use of the
booth was monitored. Takings law is rarely posed with the question of
whether an intrusion limited in time constitutes a taking because the gov-
ernment rarely attempts to accomplish tasks which do not require perma-
nent possession or regulation through coercive means; the government
does not even think of exposing citizens to these sorts of harms on a regu-
lar basis or at a moment's notice, so these sorts of issues only arise in cases
of emergency.148 The government would not seize a phone booth while a
person is inside it making a phone call, and it would not seize a person's
right to sleep on a friend's couch in the middle of the night. The sudden,
violent nature of a criminal seizure, which is necessary for an effective
search, is simply not present in takings cases.149 The piercing of the private
space is a necessary part of obtaining evidence that is hidden out of public
sight or sense. Thus, while criminal searches do not result in a long-term
deprivation, they take away the privacy that a typical takings case leaves
intact.
The dissimilarity between the government action in searches and more
typical physical takings could be used to argue that takings law is ill-
equipped to assess the sort of harms suffered in a search. This more amor-
phous quality of privacy is not actually reflected in the market value of the
property or in a rental of the space for the time of the search. The real
harm would not be compensated and would result only in a trivial payment
loosely tied to the harm suffered. However, I would argue takings law is in
no way incapable of making this valuation; it is a typical recovery theory in
takings law to look at the consequential harms suffered due to the tak-
ing.1"o The fact that private space is generally left untrammeled does not
mean that courts cannot make these assessments as they make these valua-
tions in trespass cases.
6. Political Will/Management Problems
The reasons above are the main ones grounded in some intrinsic quali-
ties of takings and criminal law which I can see explaining the failure to
compensate. The other major problem with a recognition of a takings
claim in home searches is that there would be no political will for a regime
which hampers police departments by forcing payments every time a home
is entered. An opponent might suggest this program would be hugely ex-
pensive, causing the government to have to make these payouts every time
any sort of physical intrusion into a space was made, and would likely chill
police from entering private property.15 1 I find it very unlikely that the
148. See supra notes 127-28.
149. See, e.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595 (not applying the exclusionary rule to violations of the
knock-and-announce rule on the grounds that the rule was never intended to allow shielding of the
contents of the home from search).
150. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373; Petty Motor, 377 U.S. 372.
151. To the contrary, the greater problem could result from police finding the takings system
overly burdensome and attempting to avoid the traditional warranted search system altogether. Faced
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public would want any counterweight against police searches when proba-
ble cause exists for such a search. The public's interest is in its safety, and
as yet, no meaningful "criminal's rights" lobby has emerged to demand
payment for police incursions. Politicians and judges would not curry favor
by suggesting these sorts of reforms and they would likely expose them-
selves as targets of ridicule if they were to do so.
Concerns about the cost of such a program do not hold water. The
claimants most likely to bring suit under this right would be those who had
suffered substantial harms as a result of the search. Individuals who suf-
fered only trivial harms or limited invasions onto their privacy would likely
not find it in their financial interest to pursue such a takings claim. Thus,
concerns as to the cost of creating such a right would be mitigated, as most
recovery would be limited to individuals who had actually suffered egre-
gious harm. Further, the mere existence of this right, even if not frequently
used by searched individuals, would create good incentives for law enforce-
ment officers conducting searches to be more gentle and respectful to pri-
vacy in order to avoid making cash payouts. Allowing a right to recovery
from mere entrance into the home creates a meaningful counterweight to
the incentive to find materials as quickly as possible.
The harms that are being imposed in these cases are harms to privacy
rather than specific property damage and thus, would be extremely difficult
to price accurately, making the administration of the regime expensive for
the payments doled out. The psychic harms suffered when a home is
searched would likely have highly subjective components. For example,
would people who had just moved into a home but set up very few private
things there, have the same loss to privacy upon intrusion as those who had
lived in a home for a long time? Unlike takings cases which generally in-
volve much more easily monetizable harms based on a market valuation of
the property seized, searches would be a judicial nightmare to value accu-
rately and the public would have little interest in recognizing the full extent
of the harm suffered. I would argue that trespass cases are instructive in
this area as to how to value the privacy harms suffered, but I do not claim
that this regime would be simple to manage. My argument is instead that
the difficulty of administration does not trump the harms inflicted by these
sorts of searches.
Finally, I suggest the failure to compensate may derive from the claim-
ants' status, not as criminal suspects, but as likely poorer individuals who
may not own the property searched.s 2 Takings cases do not arise for tem-
porary inhabitants of property who have no claim against the government,
but instead with the property owners. An individual who owns some parcel
with the possibility of making payouts for forced entries, police and courts might attempt to broaden
consent doctrine. By pressuring search targets to submit to a consensual search, they would avoid both
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and potential takings payouts (as the search would
no longer be the result of a forced entrance). My intuition is that search targets would still be resistant
to allowing incursions and would resist such pressure, but this could be a potential outcome of my
proposal.
152. See also Levinson, supra note 52, at 378.
34 [VOL. 28:1
HOME SEARCHES AND TAKINGS
of property is likely to be a person of greater means than a person only
temporarily occupying or renting a space. In addition to perfected prop-
erty interests being easier to categorize (as described above), I suggest that
society is quicker to take offense at the intrusion onto permanently owned
space than onto temporarily occupied space (even space occupied over a
long period, such as a rental). This concern is borne out in Fourth Amend-
ment cases where the privacy claims of guests with full legal rights and
permissions to be in the home of another are seen as far more tenuous than
the claims of owners of property.
C. What can be done about this problem?
Based on the arguments presented in this Essay, I believe there is a
sound argument which could be made and supported based on existing le-
gal precedent for allowing home searches to be conceptualized and com-
pensated as physical takings. However, it is probably politically unfeasible
to propose that criminal defendants be paid because their homes were
searched for contraband. For the same reason and the lack of any specific
precedents or dicta permitting payments for this type of intrusion (particu-
larly as originalism becomes an increasingly influential doctrine on the Su-
preme Court), I find it unlikely a court would sustain a claim brought on
the grounds I suggest.
Nonetheless, I hope this essay demonstrates why the costs imposed on
suspects ought to at least be minimized. The mere fact that the searched
individuals may have been involved in criminal conduct does not eliminate
their right to be secure in their property; their interests in the property
existed legitimately and were taken by the search. The search's necessity
for societal ends also does not alter the cost for searched individuals. By
admitting how similar these searches are to events which routinely require
compensation under the Constitution, we begin to realistically assess the
actual costs imposed upon criminal suspects. While we may not have any
interest in paying people to search their homes, I think that if the issue is
seen as a cost, the next logical step is that the cost should be minimized.
Police departments should attempt to balance the competing needs of find-
ing evidence and protecting individuals' privacy. By drawing out these sim-
ilarities, I hope to call attention to the less tangible rights invaded by home
searches and contextualize home searches in a way which demonstrates
their value.
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